Research

Abstract:

In this paper I study the endogenous determination of de facto central bank independence through the strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal authorities in a standard sovereign default model in which debt is denominated in local currency. The model is calibrated to replicate moments of Brazil's data and I find that de facto central bank independence is lower for higher levels of debt and spread and for lower levels of GDP. The model replicates the pattern of the 2015 Brazilian recession, showing a deterioration of de facto central bank independence triggered by higher debt and spreads. I find that an economy with fully independent central bankers is characterized by lower inflation and substantially higher levels of debt and sovereign spreads.

Abstract: 

Over the last decades we have observed a rise in international reserve accumulation and an inflation decline in emerging economies. In this paper we study how central bank independence in these countries accounts for the trends observed in the data by constructing a sovereign default model with two authorities, a fiscal and a monetary authority, in which debt is issued to foreign investors and denominated in local currency. Having an independent central bank allows to accumulate more international reserves and sustain higher levels of external debt at lower default risk than in a consolidated authority model. This leads to two opposing effects on inflation: on the one hand, higher reserves increases consumption lowering its marginal utility and reducing inflation; on the other, higher levels of debt increases the incentives to generate inflation for dilution purposes. The direction and the magnitude of effects depend on the calibration of the model.

Abstract: 

Dollarization is typically adopted by countries affected by large episodes of inflation and currency devaluation as a last resort tool. However, dollarization is often seen to be costly for at least two main reasons: first, the (potential) immediate cost associated with large devaluations, and second, the future costs related to the inability to freely adjust money supply and generate seigniorage flows for the public authority. Considering these costs, is dollarization an optimal strategy? In this paper, we provide a framework for understanding whether dollarization can be rationalized as an equilibrium optimal decision. We construct an open economy model with (domestic) money and international reserves, which can be adopted as legal tender; given the state of the economy, the public authority has the option to dollarize or maintain the domestic currency. We then compare the dollarization option with other institutional designs to assess the (eventual) existence of welfare-improving monetary arrangements.

Abstract: 

During the 2011-2012 European debt crisis, banks in peripheral countries increased their domestic sovereign bonds exposure, jeopardizing their ability to lend to firms. This paper aims at studying how the deterioration of domestic banks’ balance sheets, due to higher sovereign risk, increases home bias in local government bonds, reduces lending to the domestic private sector, and affects the real economy. We build an open economy dynamic stochastic model in which banks in the home country can trade both domestic and foreign sovereign debt. We find that an exogenous spike in sovereign spreads can lead to higher levels of home bias, lower private lending and lower domestic output.